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Abstract: 
Employing a large dataset regarding venture capital investments in US Internet firms, we ana-
lyze the effect of the current financial crisis on the venture capital market. Using regression 
analysis, we find that the financial crisis led to a 20% decrease in the average amount of 
funds raised per funding round. This effect, however, can only be found in later funding 
rounds. We argue that firms in later financing rounds that need capital to survive cannot 
avoid a deduction induced by the financial crisis, whereas firms that seek initial funding 
postpone their funding and expansion plans until the capital markets have stabilized. Fur-
thermore, firms in later phases of the venture cycle are more likely to be negatively affected 
by the weak IPO market than firms seeking initial funding. Our results suggest that the finan-
cial crisis can lead to a severe “funding gap” in the financing of technological development 
and innovation. 
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1.  Introduction 
The financial crisis became clearly visible on September 15th, 2008, when the 
imminent bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers was announced. Immediately after that, the large 
insurance company American International Group (AIG) suffered a liquidity crisis following 
a downgrade in its credit rating. Following this, many other financial institutions in the US 
and around the world were affected, losing large portions of their value, and could only be 
saved from bankruptcy by government funds. Stock prices declined, and a recession began. 
This paper deals with the effects of the financial crisis on the venture capital market 
(hereafter: VC market). We expect the financial crisis to have a severe impact on the VC 
market for three reasons. First, VC firms will encounter significant difficulty in finding 
investors. Investors in VC funds are usually large institutional investors, such as pension 
funds, insurance companies, and large banks (Gompers and Lerner, 1998). At the least, the 
latter two are negatively affected by the financial crisis. They are likely to decrease their 
investments in risky assets such as VC funds. Second, given the current low activity in the 
IPO market and the decline in stock prices, VC firms face a severe exit problem. Black and 
Gilson (1998), for example, argued that the amount of funds raised by VC firms depends 
strongly on a vibrant market for IPOs. Finally, if the current economic crisis turns into a long 
recession, VC-backed firms will have problems generating sufficient revenues. Consumers 
will have less money to spend and will be likely to postpone purchases. This in turn increases 
the risk encountered by VC firms and leads to lower firm valuations. 
Thus far, to the best of our knowledge, there exists no study that has empirically 
analyzed the impact of a financial crisis on VC activity. The collapse of Lehman Brothers and 
other events leading to the current financial crisis provide a good research opportunity to 
address this question in greater detail. The following three research questions are studied: 
1. Did the financial crisis lead to a reduction in the total volume of VC funds raised? 
Is there a strong decrease in the number of VC deals? 
2. Has the financial crisis led to a reduction in the average amount of funds raised in 
each funding round? If so, what is the size of this decrease? 
3. Concerning the effects of the financial crisis, is there a difference between the 
impacts on early and later stage financing? 
Why is it important to study the effects of the current financial crisis on the VC 
market? VC is an important and vital source of funding for start-ups in innovative industries. 
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Venture capital is important in the early periods of a firm’s life, when it begins to develop 
innovative products and to commercialize its innovation (Gompers and Lerner, 2001; Zider, 
1998). At such early stages, firms do not have other institutions to turn to in order to raise 
money, and VC fills this void. The inherent risks of a start-up in that stage will not be 
accepted by banks, so early-stage companies cannot obtain loans to fund their operations. 
Furthermore, banks require lent money to be secured by hard assets, which are usually not 
available with innovative start-ups. Public equity is also not accessible at that stage, since the 
sales required for gaining public interest are still too low. Consequently, if the financial crisis 
leads to a strong decrease in VC funds provided, a funding gap in the commercialization of 
innovation arises with negative effects on economic development and growth. VC funding 
has a strong positive impact on firm growth, technological development, and the evolution of 
innovative industries (cf. Audretsch and Thurik, 2001; Bottazi et al., 2002; Florida and 
Kenney, 1988; Keuschnigg, 2004; Kortum and Lerner, 2000; Timmons and Bygrave, 1986). 
In one of the few empirical studies on this issue, Kortum and Lerner (2000) found that 
increases in an industry’s VC activity lead to higher patent activity. In their paper, they 
estimated that VC is responsible for about 10% of US industrial innovations. 
The next section introduces the data and variables. Section 3 presents the empirical 
analysis, which is then discussed in Section 4. Section 5 concludes and gives an outlook for 
further research. 
2. Data and variables 
The data were collected from the website http://www.crunchbase.com/funding-rounds 
in the first weeks of March 2009. CrunchBase summarizes information about venture capital 
activities in the US technology sector with a particular focus on Internet start-ups. The web-
site is a free database of technology firms, people, and investors that anyone can edit. It is 
operated by TechCrunch (see http://www.techcrunch.com), one of the most highly regarded 
blogs concerning technological innovations related to the Internet. As of April 1st, 2009, the 
database of CrunchBase included more than 16,000 firms, more than 1,800 financial organi-
zations, and more than 5,200 funding rounds. 
Our unit of analysis is the funding round, i.e., the financing round where start-ups 
raise money to finance their operations and development efforts. Table 1 shows the steps un-
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dertaken to create the data set, which comprises 1,420 funding rounds1 and 1,136 VC-backed 
firms. Our dependent variable is the amount of funds raised in the funding round (raised 
amount). Our independent variables are as follows. The variable financial crisis is a dummy 
variable that indicates whether funding took place from October 2008 to February 2009, the 
months after the crash of the Lehman Brothers Bank. A total of 210 of the 1,420 funding 
rounds occurred during this period. To distinguish between the effects of the financial crisis 
and other firm, industry, and VC characteristics, we constructed several control variables 
such as the stage of the financing (first round versus a later round) or the type of VC investor 
(e.g., strategic investor). Table 2 summarizes the variables and gives the exact definitions of 
the variables used. 
[Insert Table 1 and 2 here] 
3. Empirical analysis 
3.1 VC funding in US Internet start-ups from January 2007 to February 2009 
Table 3 shows the evolution of VC activity in the US Internet sector from January 
2007 to February 2009 based on the dataset described above. Two trends can be observed. 
First, during the time period before the crash, the VC market grew significantly. For example, 
the total amount of funds raised increased from $438 m in January 2007 to $1,094 m in Janu-
ary 2008. Accordingly, the number of funding rounds per month also increased from 42 
rounds in January 2007 to 93 rounds in January 2008. Second, when comparing the time pe-
riod before the crisis with the period of the crisis, a decrease in VC activity can be observed. 
In August 2008 (September 2008), the total funding volume was $598 m ($512 m), whereas 
the total funding volume in October 2008 (November 2008) was only $366 m ($365 m). The 
number of funding rounds per month dropped as well, with 57 in August and 50 in September 
versus 49 in October and 39 in November. In summary, there is a decrease in VC activity due 
to the financial crisis, although it is not as large as one might have expected. This might be 
explained by ongoing negotiations initiated before the crash in September 2008 that became 
effective some months later. In summary, the VC market did not come to an immediate and 
complete halt. 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
                                                 
1
  These funding rounds involved 3,724 VC investments. Note that a funding round often involves several 
investors (e.g., start-up A is financed by an investment consortium that consists of investors B, C, and D). 
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3.2 Univariate analysis: VC funding before and during the financial crisis period 
Tables 4a and 4b show descriptive statistics regarding the characteristics of the fund-
ing rounds in the periods before and during the crisis. The period before the crash includes 
the months from January 2007 to August 2008; the period of the crisis includes the months 
from October 2008 to February 2009.2 As we only have information on a monthly basis, we 
had to make a choice concerning the month of September 2008. We decided to include this 
month in the category before the financial crisis. The reason is that we expect a time lag of 
some weeks between the negotiations by the investors and the start-up company leading to 
the financing and the date when the deal is announced publicly. In the comparison of charac-
teristics of the funding rounds, we distinguished between first and later rounds. The first 
funding rounds are conducted to provide initial seed money to start-up companies. Second 
and later rounds are required to equip start-up firms with additional substantial funds so that 
they can continue with their development, marketing, or internationalization efforts. For ex-
ample, in September 2004, Facebook received its first financing round, which amounted to 
$0.5 m. This first funding round was followed by several later financing rounds, which pro-
vided Facebook with an additional funding volume of $515.5 m.3 
Table 4a shows this comparison for the sample of first funding rounds (N=840 fund-
ing rounds). The results are surprising. Except for the lower share of the industry category 
web (37% before the crisis vs. 24% during the crisis, p<0.05), there are no significant differ-
ences in VC funding between the time periods before and during the crisis. Most importantly, 
we do not observe a decrease in the average funding amount (the mean is $8.8 m before the 
crisis vs. $9.3 m during the crisis, p=0.804). 
The situation is fairly different when the sample of later funding rounds is examined 
(N=580 funding rounds). Table 4b reports the results of this comparison. The average amount 
of funds raised in each funding round decreases strongly (the mean is $12.6 m before the cri-
sis vs. $9.5 m during the crisis, p<0.05). Two other trends can also be observed: the share of 
financing rounds led by a consortium increases (73.1% before the crisis vs. 82.4% during the 
crisis, p<0.05), as does the average firm age of the funded company (the mean is 937 days vs. 
1,132 days, p<0.1). 
[Insert Table 4a and 4b here] 
                                                 
2
  The end date of February 2009 is determined by the date in which the data collection ended (March 25th, 
2009). This allowed us to use the entire month of February. 
3
  Data source: http://www.crunchbase.com/company/facebook (accessed March 25th, 2009). 
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3.3 Regression analysis: the effect of the financial crisis on VC funds raised 
To analyze the impact of the financial crisis on VC funds raised while accounting for 
characteristics of the firm, the VC, and the industry, we estimated several regression models. 
Before we proceeded with these regressions, we calculated correlation values and variance 
inflation factors (VIFs). The results are displayed in Table 5. The low VIFs indicate that mul-
ticollinearity is not an issue in our investigations. 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
We wanted to investigate the effect of the financial crisis on the average amount of 
funds raised in each funding round. We therefore used raised amount as the dependent vari-
able. Table 6 shows the results of the regressions. In Model I, an OLS regression with raised 
amount per funding round as the dependent variable is estimated. Model II shows a regres-
sion that uses the natural log of raised amount as the dependent variable. Finally, Model III is 
a quantile regression that estimates the median of the amount of funds raised (Koenker and 
Hallock, 2001). The results are as follows: the financial crisis does not have a significant im-
pact on the amount of funds raised per funding round in Model I (ß=-1.95, p>0.1) or Model II 
(ß=-0.11, p>0.1), but it does have a significant impact in Model III (ß=-1.00, p<0.05). This 
leaves us with mixed results concerning the impact of the financial crisis on the average 
amounts of funds raised per funding round. We explain the differences between Model I and 
Model III, with the existence of outliers that influence the results of the OLS model but do 
not have an impact on the quantile regression.4 Quantile regressions estimate conditional 
quantile functions—that is, models in which quantiles of the conditional distribution of the 
dependent variable such as the median are expressed as functions of several independent va-
riables (Koenker and Bassett, 1978; Koenker and Hallock, 2001). Quantiles such as the me-
dian are more robust to outliers than the mean, which is estimated in OLS regressions. In this 
paper, we estimated a quantile regression on the median of the dependent variable. This kind 
of model is often simply referred to as a median regression. 
The control variables have the expected signs. If the firm is financed by an investment 
consortium, the median amount of funds raised increases by about $1 m (e.g., Model III: 
ß=3.83, p<0.01). The variable firm age has a positive impact on the amount of funds raised 
(e.g., Model III: ß=1.15, p<0.01). Firms in the second or later funding rounds raise larger 
                                                 
4
  In nine cases, the amount of funds raised was greater than $100 m. The maximum is $300 m (the funded 
company was ZeniMax Media Inc., which is a firm that develops online games). 
 6 
amounts of capital than do firms in the first round (e.g., Model III: ß=1.50, p<0.01). Industry 
variables are found to be jointly significant in Models II and III (p<0.01) but insignificant in 
Model I (p>0.1). Overall, the findings are reasonable and in line with our prior expectations. 
The explanatory power of our models is acceptable (e.g., R²=0.28 in model II). 
In the next step, we divided the sample into two sub-samples: Sample I includes only 
the first funding round, whereas Sample II includes only the second or later funding rounds. 
Table 7 shows the results of both sub-sample regressions. A strong difference can be ob-
served. The variable financial crisis has a strong negative effect on the amount of funds 
raised in the sample of second or later funding rounds (Model II: ß=-0.22, p<0.05), but it has 
no significant effect in the sample of first funding rounds (Model I: ß=0.02, p=0.889).5 That 
is, the effect of the financial crisis seems to differ with regard to the stage of financing. We 
interpret this finding in the discussion section. 
[Insert Table 6 and 7 here] 
3.4 Robustness check: correction for treatment effects using propensity score matching 
To verify the robustness of the results, we conducted an estimation using propensity 
score matching. Propensity score matching is a method for reducing the bias in the estimation 
of treatment effects (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). Treatment effects may arise if the as-
signment of observations to the treatment and control group is not a random process. In our 
case, this means that firms seeking VC during a financial crisis are not randomly drawn out 
of the total population of firms that seek VC. Or, put differently and explained more directly, 
firms that seek VC in a financial crisis might differ from firms that would normally seek VC 
(e.g., they are older, have a better-developed business concept, etc.). By using propensity 
score matching, we seek to “correct” the estimation of the effect of the financial crisis by 
comparing the outcome of funding rounds that are as similar as possible except for the fact 
that one funding round did occur during the financial crisis (treatment group) and the other 
did not (control group). Here, to find the control group, we used the propensity score match-
ing algorithms provided by Becker and Ichino (2002). 
The results are in line with the regression results in the previous sections. Controlling 
for treatment effects, we find a strong negative effect of the financial crisis on the amount of 
funds raised in later funding rounds (the effect varies between -15% and -19%, depending on 
                                                 
5
  A Chow test of the equality of coefficients (Chow, 1960) is weakly significant (p=0.100). 
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the matching algorithm used—see Table 8c). As in the regressions discussed above, we ob-
tain insignificant results if the sample includes only the first funding rounds. In the full sam-
ple, the effect varies between -1% and -18% (Table 8a).6 
[Insert Table 8a, 8b, and 8c here] 
3.5 Summary of main results 
Summarizing our main results, our empirical analysis shows that the current financial 
crisis has an effect on VC activity in the US Internet sector. The total volume of funds de-
creased, as did the number of funding rounds. The VC market, however, did not come to an 
abrupt halt but instead exhibited a systematic and remarkable decline in transaction size. We 
find that the financial crisis had a negative impact on the amount of funds raised per funding 
round. The effect, however, seems to be present only when later funding rounds are con-
cerned. The next section discusses our findings. 
4. Discussion of the results 
The most surprising finding is that the effect of the financial crisis differs with regard 
to the stage of financing. During the financial crisis, firms in later financing rounds received 
about 20% less funds than they would have received during the period before the financial 
crisis. For firms obtaining initial financing, no such devaluations are observed. How can this 
result be explained? Our first explanation is that firms already at a later stage of the venture 
cycle cannot avoid the deduction due to the financial crisis since they need capital to survive. 
Another explanation concerns the current unhealthy state of the IPO market. VC firms usu-
ally do not provide patient capital, instead intending to sell the firm in which they have in-
vested after a certain time period (usually a few years) in order to provide adequate returns 
for investors in the VC fund. Conducting an IPO in a recession is not an attractive option.7 
Firms at later stages of the venture cycle become less attractive as investment targets, espe-
cially because the prospects of a revival of the IPO market in the immediate term are poor. 
The situation is different for firms seeking initial funding: These firms can (and will) 
postpone their funding and expansion plans until the capital markets stabilize. Some entre-
preneurs might even refrain from starting a company at all because they do not expect to ob-
                                                 
6
  This does not include the insignificant estimate obtained from the radius matching approach. 
7
  Another exit avenue would be to get acquired by a larger firm. 
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tain adequate funding. Entrepreneurs of early-stage companies might consider alternative 
employment options. 
5. Conclusions and outlook 
5.1 Implications for firms seeking venture capital 
Firms that seek VC are affected by the financial crisis. Our analysis shows that the fi-
nancial crisis has led to a decrease in the amount of funds raised, particularly in later funding 
rounds. Firms that seek VC should keep this in mind and consider regions or countries that 
are less strongly affected by the financial crisis instead of the US. Moving the business is an 
option to consider. Start-ups that have already received initial funding and now want (or 
need) to obtain further funding should include in their business planning a discount of 20% as 
a result of the financial crisis. Cutting costs or postponing expansion plans might be neces-
sary. In an unhealthy VC market, they will encounter difficulties in raising the funds required 
to further finance their product development, marketing, and internationalization efforts. 
5.2 Implications for the evolution of innovative industries and technological development 
VC is an important means of funding for start-ups in innovative and technology-
driven industries because it is the vehicle used to turn innovative ideas into products that can 
be sold to customers. VC particularly matters when firms start to commercialize their 
innovations, that is, when they develop their products, apply for patents, look for distribution 
partners, seek first customers, conduct their internationalization strategies, or simply scale up 
their operations. (Gompers and Lerner, 2001; Zider, 1998). VC firms not only provide 
financial means but also offer management support (Schefczyk and Gerpott, 2001) and access 
to expanded networks. Florida and Kenney (1988, p. 119) see VC firms as “technological 
gatekeepers accelerating the process of technological change.” So, if, due to an external 
shock caused by a financial crisis, the VC market dries up, this can have long-lasting negative 
effects with regard to the evolution of innovative industries. Innovative firms might run into 
severe liquidity problems, and the speed of commercialization of technological innovations 
might slow down. Ultimately, the country’s path to economic growth can be negatively 
affected. 
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5.3 Outlook 
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to empirically document and ana-
lyze the effects of a financial crisis on VC activity. VC is still a relatively new phenomenon, 
but it has become an element vital to the current economy. In the 1980s, VC became an im-
portant source of funding for innovative start-ups (Gompers, 1994). In our present paper, we 
argue that a financial crisis can have a strong, exogenous impact on VC activity, which can 
then lead to a severe “funding gap” in the financing of technological development and inno-
vation. Unlike the last slowdown of VC activities after the collapse of the New Economy 
bubble in the year 2000, the current slowdown came more as an exogenous shock. In the cur-
rent crisis, it was clearly not unrealistic expectations regarding the Internet and the New 
Economy but instead a malfunctioning financial sector that initiated the downturn that caused 
the slowdown. 
Many questions are left unanswered and provide good opportunities for future re-
search. Does the impact of financial crises on VC activity differ among industries or regions? 
For example, is there a similar effect of the financial crisis in biotechnology or semiconductor 
fields? How do start-ups receiving funding in this financial crisis differ from start-ups that 
had received funding before the financial crisis? Is there a kind of selection effect, where only 
the more promising ventures receive funding? How do the start-ups respond to the challenges 
posed by the financial crisis and the difficulties encountered in the search for VC funding? 
Does a lower success rate of VC-backed companies lead to a decline in the performance of 
VC funds? And ultimately, over a long time period, does VC as a financing instrument for 
innovative start-ups become severely harmed as an effect of the crisis? 
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Table 1: Construction of the sample 
 
Total number of funding rounds in the period from January 2007 to February 2009 2,935 obs. 
- Amount of funds raised is missing. 359 obs. 
- Variable investment consortium is a missing value. 427 obs. 
- Industry category is biotech (6 obs.), cleantech (39 obs.), semiconductor (12 obs.), or other (25 obs.). 82 obs. 
- Investment is not given US-$ (92 obs.) or is not in the US (494 obs.). 586 obs. 
- Firm did not survive until February 2009. 14 obs. 
-  Funding round is a debt round. 
 
47 obs. 
 
Final sample 1,420 obs. 
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Table 2: Variable descriptions 
 
  
Variable name Description 
  
  
Raised amount Funds raised in the funding round (in US-$). 
Log(raised amount) Natural log of raised amount. 
Financial crisis Dummy variable, 1 if funding occurred in the period from Oct. 2008 to Feb. 2009. 
First round Dummy variable, 1 if first funding round. 
Second or later round Dummy variable, 1 if second or later funding round. 
Investment consortium Dummy variable, 1 if funding round consists of at least two VC investors. 
Strategic investor in investment consortium Dummy variable, 1 if at least one of the investors is a non-financial firm.  
Business angel in investment consortium Dummy variable, 1 if at least one of the investors is a person (and not a firm). 
Firm age Date of funding round minus founding date of firm; missing values are imputed with sample median. 
Firm age is missing Dummy variable, 1 if firm age is a missing value (which is the case in N=857 obs.). 
Industry dummies 12 dummy variables indicating the industry categories: web, advertising, ecommerce, enterprise, games and video, hardware, mobile, 
network hosting, public relations, search, security, and software. The industry categories were obtained from CrunchBase. 
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Table 3: VC funding in US Internet start-ups from January 2007 to February 2009 
 
 
 2007 
Variables 
 
Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May June July Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. 
             
N funding rounds 42 39 33 34 60 70 57 62 71 77 53 53 
 N first rounds 27 23 20 20 44 48 35 49 47 61 40 38 
 N second or later rounds 15 16 13 14 26 22 22 13 24 16 13 15 
First rounds in % of total 64% 59% 61% 59% 73% 69% 61% 79% 66% 79% 75% 72% 
             
Total raised amount  
(in m $) 438 368 243 356 439 475 642 625 789 964 653 668 
Mean raised amount in 
each round (in m $) 10.4 9.4 7.4 10.5 7.3 6.8 11.3 10.1 11.1 12.5 12.3 12.6 
Median raised amount in 
each round (in m $) 5.5 7 5 8 5.2 5.1 5 5.3 7.4 6 7 6 
 
 2008 
Variables 
 
Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May June July Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. 
             
N funding rounds 93 56 71 72 46 64 50 57 50 49 39 37 
 N first rounds 55 35 44 31 18 30 26 32 26 27 19 18 
 N second or later rounds 38 21 27 41 28 34 24 25 24 22 20 19 
First rounds in % of total 59% 63% 62% 43% 39% 47% 52% 56% 52% 55% 49% 49% 
             
Total raised amount  
(in m $) 1,094 505 550 936 483 605 481 598 512 366 365 322 
Mean raised amount in 
each round (in m $) 11.7 9.0 7.7 13 10.5 9.5 9.6 10.5 10.3 7.5 9.4 8.7 
Median raised amount in 
each round (in m $) 8.1 5 5 6 6.6 7.1 7.3 8 6.4 5.5 7 8 
 
 2009 
Variables Jan. Feb. 
   
N funding rounds 48 37 
 N first rounds 17 10 
 N second or later 
rounds  31 27 
First rounds in % of 
total 35% 27% 
   
Total raised amount  
(in m $) 578 349 
Mean raised amount in 
each round (in m $) 12.0 9.4 
Median raised amount in 
each round (in m $) 6 7.8 
 
Data source: http://www.crunchbase.com/funding-rounds (accessed March 25th, 2009) 
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Table 4a: Univariate analysis: VC funding before and during the crisis—first rounds only 
 
  
 
 
Before crisis 
(Jan. 2007 to Sep. 2008) 
During crisis 
(Oct. 2008 to Feb. 2009) 
 
 
Variable Mean (Std. dev.) 
 
Mean (Std. dev.) p-value 1 
  
Raised amount per funding round (in m $) 8.8 (16.3) 9.3 (26.0) p=0.804 
Investment consortium (in %) 61.2 60.4 p=0.876 
Strategic investor in investment consortium (in %) 22.2 16.5 p=0.213 
Business angel in investment consortium (in %) 18.0 14.3 p=0.377 
Firm age (in days) 2 759 (782) 852 (885) p=0.586 
 
Industry categories 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   Web (in %) 36.8 24.2 p=0.017 
   Advertising (in %) 8.5 6.6 p=0.525 
   Ecommerce (in %) 3.2 5.4 p=0.259 
   Enterprise (in %) 4.4 7.7 p=0.165 
   Games and video (in %) 11.5 15.4 p=0.278 
   Hardware (in %) 4.7 7.7 p=0.212 
   Mobile (in %) 9.9 9.9 p=0.998 
   Network hosting (in %) 5.7 2.2 p=0.156 
   Public relations (in %) 1.3 3.3 p=0.152 
   Search (in %) 2.5 1.1 p=0.400 
   Security (in %) 1.2 3.3 p=0.112 
   Software (in %) 10.0 13.2 p=0.348 
    
N funding rounds (first rounds only) 749 91  
 
1 
= Test of equality of means or test of equality of proportions 
2
 = Based only on non-missing observations (N=294) 
Data source: http://www.crunchbase.com/funding-rounds (accessed March 25th, 2009) 
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Table 4b: Univariate analysis: VC funding before and during the crisis—second and later rounds only 
 
  
 
 
Before crisis 
(Jan. 2007 to Sep. 2008) 
During crisis 
(Oct. 2008 to Feb. 2009) 
 
 
Variable Mean (Std. dev.) 
 
Mean (Std. dev.) p-value 1 
  
Raised amount per funding round (in m $) 12.6 (16.1) 9.5 (7.6) p=0.043 
Investment consortium (in %) 73.1 82.4 p=0.038 
Strategic investor in investment consortium (in %) 28.0 27.7 p=0.957 
Business angel in investment consortium (in %) 13.7 10.9 p=0.429 
Firm age (in days) 2 937 (683) 1,132 (696) p=0.062 
 
Industry categories 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   Web (in %) 30.0 38.7 p=0.068 
   Advertising (in %) 9.3 6.7 p=0.371 
   Ecommerce (in %) 3.9 6.7 p=0.185 
   Enterprise (in %) 6.0 4.2 p=0.432 
   Games and video (in %) 12.8 7.6 p=0.114 
   Hardware (in %) 4.3 3.4 p=0.633 
   Mobile (in %) 10.4 7.6 p=0.352 
   Network hosting (in %) 7.6 5.9 p=0.521 
   Public relations (in %) 2.0 0.8 p=0.406 
   Search (in %) 3.9 5.9 p=0.344 
   Security (in %) 0.7 0.8 p=0.824 
   Software (in %) 9.1 11.8 p=0.382 
    
N funding rounds (second and later rounds only) 461 119  
 
1 
= Test of equality of means or test of equality of proportions 
2
 = Based only on non-missing observations (N=269) 
Data source: http://www.crunchbase.com/funding-rounds (accessed March 25th, 2009) 
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Table 5: Correlations and descriptive statistics 
 
            
 Mean Std. dev. Min.  Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 VIF 
1 Raised amount (in m $) 10.1 16.6 0.1 300        
2 Financial crisis (dummy) 0.15  0 1 -0.02      1.03 
3 Second or later round (dummy) 0.41  0 1 0.09 0.13     1.08 
4 Investment consortium (dummy) 0.67  0 1 0.08 0.05 0.14    1.09 
5 Strategic investor in investment consortium (dummy) 0.24  0 1 0.14 -0.01 0.07 0.09   1.03 
6 Business angel in investment consortium (dummy) 0.16  0 1 -0.11 -0.04 -0.06 0.15 -0.07  1.10 
7 Firm age (in yrs) 1.60 1.44 0.08 11.76 0.28 0.10 0.14 0.06 0.03 -0.19 1.32 
             
 
N=1,420 funding rounds 
VIF=Variance inflation factor (industry dummies and the dummy variable indicating missing values with firm age are included in the calculation of the VIFs) 
Correlations with an absolute value greater than 0.05 have a p-value ≤ 0.05. The Pearson correlation coefficient is used for metric variables, the point-biserial correlation coefficient is 
used in case one variable is dichotomous, and Cramer’s V is used if both variables are dummy variables. 
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Table 6: Regressions of raised amount per funding round 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent variable 
 
Independent variable 
Model I 
(OLS) 
 
Raised amount (in m $) 
 
ß (SE) 
Model II 
(OLS) 
 
Log(raised amount) 
 
ß (SE) 
Model III 
(Quantile regression) 1 
 
Raised amount (in m $) 
 
ß (SE) 
    
Financial crisis (dummy) -1.95 (1.49) -0.11 (0.08) -1.00 (0.40) ** 
Second or later round (dummy) 2 2.15 (0.76) *** 0.44 (0.06) *** 1.50 (0.29) *** 
Investment consortium (dummy) 2.38 (1.18) ** 0.92 (0.08) *** 3.83 (0.31) *** 
Strategic investor in investment consortium (dummy) 4.41 (1.37) *** -0.06 (0.10) 0.99 (0.33) *** 
Business angel in investment consortium (dummy) -4.08 (1.53) *** -1.02 (0.10) *** -4.40 (0.40) *** 
Firm age (in yrs) 3 1.62 (0.37) *** 0.21 (0.03) *** 1.15 (0.11) *** 
       
Industry dummies 4, 5       
   Advertising 2.92 (1.45) ** 0.25 (0.12) ** 1.79 (0.54) *** 
   Ecommerce 3.96 (2.09) * 0.30 (0.19) 0.81 (0.75) 
   Enterprise 0.01 (1.31) 0.30 (0.13) ** 0.90 (0.67) 
   Games and video 3.81 (2.07) * 0.33 (0.13) ** 1.40 (0.47) *** 
   Hardware 4.45 (2.13) ** 0.60 (0.13) ** 5.35 (0.70) *** 
   Mobile 1.11 (0.95) 0.24 (0.12) * 1.72 (0.51) *** 
   Network hosting 3.18 (1.84) * 0.23 (0.15)  1.23 (0.61) ** 
   Public relations 3.46 (2.98) 0.47 (0.17) *** 1.36 (1.11) 
   Search 5.00 (4.08) 0.26 (0.23) 1.72 (0.81) ** 
   Security 1.92 (2.63) 0.42 (0.29) 2.89 (1.31) ** 
   Software 1.25 (1.32) 0.30 (0.10) *** 1.39 (0.50) *** 
       
Constant 0.91 (1.00) 0.19 (0.12) * 0.33 (0.45) 
      
  
N funding rounds (firms) 1,420 (1,136) 1,420 (1,136) 1,420 (1,136) 
F-test p<0.001 p<0.001  
R² 0.07 0.28  
Adjusted R² 0.06 0.27  
Pseudo R²   0.13 
 
 
In the OLS models: standard errors (SE) are robust and clustered by firms. * p≤0.10; *** p≤0.05; *** p≤0.01; two-sided tests employed. 
1
  The quantile regression estimates the median value of raised amount. 
2
  First round is used as a reference category. 
3
  In some cases, firm age is imputed with the median computed from the non-missing observations. To correct for  
this imputation, we included a dummy variable in the regression indicating when imputation took place. 
4
  Industry category web is used as a reference category. 
5
  An F-test of the joint significance of the industry variables is significant in Model II (p<0.01) and Model III (p<0.001) and insignificant in Model I. 
Data source: http://www.crunchbase.com/funding-rounds (accessed March 25th, 2009) 
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Table 7: The effect of the financial crisis on first and later funding rounds 
 
   
 Model I 
 
Sample: First rounds only 
Model II 
 
Sample: Second or later rounds only 
 
Dependent variable 
 
 
Independent variable 
Log(raised amount) 
 
OLS 
ß (SE) 
Log(raised amount) 
 
OLS 
ß (SE) 
 
Chow test of 
the equality of 
coefficients 
 
    
Financial crisis (dummy) 0.02 (0.13) -0.22 (0.09) ** p=0.100 
Investment consortium (dummy) 1.03 (0.11) *** 0.73 (0.10) *** p<0.001 
Strategic investor in investment consortium (dummy) -0.28 (0.15) * 0.24 (0.09) *** p<0.001 
Business angel in investment consortium (dummy) -1.10 (0.13) *** -0.92 (0.15) *** p=0.079 
Firm age (in yrs.) 1 0.22 (0.04) *** 0.19 (0.04) *** p<0.001 
      
Industry dummies 2, 3      
   Advertising 0.24 (0.18) 0.28 (0.14) ** p=0.032 
   Ecommerce 0.24 (0.29) 0.26 (0.23) p=0.247 
   Enterprise 0.43 (0.15) *** 0.13 (0.17) p=0.937 
   Games and video 0.36 (0.17) ** 0.25 (0.16) p=0.134 
   Hardware 0.65 (0.18) *** 0.37 (0.20) * p=0.588 
   Mobile 0.26 (0.17) 0.20 (0.15) p=0.154 
   Network hosting 0.36 (0.20) * 0.09 (0.18) p=0.803 
   Public relations 0.32 (0.24) 0.57 (0.24) ** p=0.034 
   Search 0.06 (0.36) 0.38 (0.24) p=0.091 
   Security 0.24 (0.29) 0.92 (0.54) * p=0.100 
   Software 0.35 (0.14) ** 0.17 (0.13) p=0.351 
      
Constant 0.12 (0.14) 0.84 (0.16) ***  
      
    
N funding rounds 840 580  
F-test p<0.001 p<0.001  
R² 0.26 0.27  
Adjusted R² 0.24 0.25  
    
 
Standard errors (SE) are robust and clustered by firms. * p≤0.10; ** p≤0.05; *** p≤0.01; two-sided tests applied. 
1
  In some cases, firm age is imputed with the median computed from the non-missing observations. To correct for  
this imputation, we included a dummy variable in the regression indicating when imputation took place. 
2
  Industry category web is used as a reference category. 
3
  An F-test of the joint significance of the industry variables is significant in Model I (p<0.1) and insignificant in Model II. 
Data source: http://www.crunchbase.com/funding-rounds (accessed March 25th, 2009) 
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Table 8a: Propensity score matching estimation – all funding rounds 
 
Dependent variable: log(raised amount) 
# 
 
Matching approach 1 
 
N of treatment group 2 
 
N of control group 3 
 
Average treatment effect 
 
 
Std. err. 
 
 
t-statistic 
 
 
Nearest neighbor matching (random weights) 
(attnd.ado) 
 
 
210 
 
648 
 
-0.185 
 
0.096 
 
-1.920 
Nearest neighbor matching (equal weights) 
(attnw.ado) 
 
210 648 -0.181 0.108 -1.680 
Radius matching  
(attr.ado) 
 
210 1,203 0.064 0.090 0.706 
Kernel matching  
(attk.ado) 
210 1,203 -0.013 0.085 -0.158 
      
 
1
 Stata command in parentheses 
2
 Number of funding rounds during the financial crisis 
3
 Number of funding rounds before the financial crisis 
The propensity score is calculated using the control variables included in the regressions in Table 6. 
Standard errors are calculated using bootstrapping (number of bootstraps is 50). 
Data source: http://www.crunchbase.com/funding-rounds (accessed March 25th, 2009) 
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Table 8b: Propensity score matching estimation—first funding rounds only 
 
Dependent variable: log(raised amount) 
 
 
Matching method 1 
 
N of treatment group 2 
 
N of control group 3 
 
Average treatment effect 
 
 
Std. err. 
 
 
t-statistic 
 
 
Nearest neighbor matching (random weights) 
(attnd.ado) 
 
 
91 
 
391 
 
-0.066 
 
0.170 
 
-0.389 
Nearest neighbor matching (equal weights) 
(attnw.ado) 
 
91 391 -0.151 0.159 -0.951 
Radius matching  
(attr.ado) 
 
91 734 0.141 0.143 0.986 
Kernel matching  
(attk.ado) 
91 734 0.102 0.140 0.729 
      
 
1
 Stata command in parentheses 
2
 Number of first funding rounds during the financial crisis 
3 Number of first funding rounds before the financial crisis 
The propensity score is calculated using the control variables included in the regressions in Table 7 (Model I). 
Standard errors are calculated using bootstrapping (number of bootstraps is 50). 
Data source: http://www.crunchbase.com/funding-rounds (accessed March 25th, 2009) 
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Table 8c: Propensity score matching estimation—second and later rounds only 
 
Dependent variable: log(raised amount) 
# 
 
Matching approach 1 
 
N of treatment group 2 
 
N of control group 3 
 
Average treatment effect 
 
 
Std. err. 
 
 
t-statistic 
 
 
Nearest neighbor matching (random weights) 
(attnd.ado) 
 
 
119 
 
446 
 
-0.147 
 
0.108 
 
-1.359 
Nearest neighbor matching (equal weights) 
(attnw.ado) 
 
119 223 -0.182 0.124 -1.473 
Radius matching  
(attr.ado) 
 
119 446 -0.147 0.107 -1.372 
Kernel matching  
(attk.ado) 
119 446 -0.191 0.089 -2.153 
      
 
1
 Stata command in parentheses 
2
 Number of second and later funding rounds during the financial crisis 
3 Number of second and later funding rounds before the financial crisis 
The propensity score is calculated using the control variables included in the regressions in Table 7 (Model II). 
Standard errors are calculated using bootstrapping (number of bootstraps is 50). 
Data source: http://www.crunchbase.com/funding-rounds (accessed March 25th, 2009) 
 
